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REASONABLE DOUBTS ABOUT 
REASONABLE NONBELIEF
Douglas V. Henry
In Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, J. L. Schellenberg argues that the 
phenomenon of "reasonable nonbelief" constitutes sufficient reason to doubt 
the existence of God. In this essay I assert the reasonableness of entertain­
ing doubts about the kind of reasonable nonbelief that Schellenberg needs 
for a cogent argument. Treating his latest set of arguments in this journal, 
I dispute his claims about the scope and status of "unreflective nonbelief," 
his assertion that God would prevent reasonable nonbelief "of any kind and 
duration," and his confidence that we can know that some doubters are not 
self-deceived.
In "Does Reasonable Nonbelief Exist?" (DRNE)1 I described John 
Schellenberg's atheological argument in Divine Hiddenness and Human 
Reason (DH)2 as a worthy effort. Yet while I admire DH, I remain uncon­
vinced that its argument is sound. Indeed, Schellenberg's recent reply, 
"On Reasonable Nonbelief and Perfect Love" (ORN),3 demonstrates anew 
some of his argument's deficiencies. To see how this is so I will review his 
argument and my initial critique, and then offer an appraisal of his latest 
set of responses.
I
Schellenberg's argument is deceptively simple. At DH, p. 81 he argues: 
(P1) If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.
(P2) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur. 
(P3) Reasonable nonbelief occurs.4 
(P4) No perfectly loving God exists.
(P5) There is no God.
In DRNE I argued that the kind of reasonable nonbelief needed for a co­
gent argument is unlikely to exist. To preclude shoddy investigation or 
self-deception, Schellenberg looks to persons of high intellectual and moral 
virtue who have adequately investigated God's existence. They combine 
"exemplary investigative procedure, great expenditure of time and energy, 
honesty in other situations, love for truth, rational self-control, and . . . 
desire to have the issue responsibly settled" (DRNE, p. 80). Given the am­
biguity of the evidence, they are not swayed either way. They apparently
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cannot be faulted for their doubt since they have done their best to settle 
the issue. Yet on closer analysis, I argued, persons such as Schellenberg 
stipulates are rare. Further, the factors he identifies do not guarantee ad­
equate investigation. Even if they did, the result would be "persistent, con­
tinued seeking" (DRNE, p. 82), and if one remains on a quest to discern 
God's existence, it is hard to see the evil that worries Schellenberg. After 
all, the determined will to find God is a step toward the "ultimate and 
perfect happiness" that lies in the divine vision, insofar as "rectitude of 
will is required for happiness both antecedently and concomitantly."5 Far 
from bereft, such persons are near the God who assures, "those who seek 
me diligently find me" (Prv 8:17).
In his latest essay, Schellenberg offers three complaints about my cri­
tique.6 First, I "assume that reasonable nonbelief is reasonable doubt," 
limiting my attention to reflective forms of reasonable nonbelief (ORN, p. 
330). Since reasonable nonbelief includes both reflective and nonreflective 
instances, even if my critique succeeded, "nothing follows for nonbelief in 
general, since plenty of instances of nonbelief do not presuppose reflec­
tion" (ORN, p. 331). Second, I overlook his "starting point in reflection 
on the nature of Divine Love" (ORN, p. 334). Instead, I reconstruct his 
argument "'from below,' guided by independent consideration of what 
reasonable nonbelief might be and the justifications a God might have for 
permitting it," instead of "from above," whereby one can see that "God 
would not permit inculpable nonbelief of any kind or for any duration" 
(ORN, p. 334). Third, I insufficiently attend to the grounds under which 
worries about self-deception are justified. Rejecting my concern that self­
deception "is always a possibility, and can perhaps never reasonably be 
ruled out," Schellenberg says we "sometimes have good grounds for be­
lieving an individual to be honest . . . and also that some doubters are 
honest" (ORN, p. 332).
Each complaint has answers, so that it is reasonable to doubt the exis­
tence of the kind of reasonable nonbelief Schellenberg needs for a cogent 
argument. Before those answers, however, note a general problem for his 
argument. Put simply, if the standards for reasonable nonbelief are strin­
gent, it becomes plausible to hold that they are never met, while if they 
are more relaxed, it is dubious that God would of necessity prevent such 
nonbelief from occurring. This is why the nonbelief needed for his argu­
ment to persuade is hard to come by. The kind of reasonable nonbelief 
most readily identified is least likely to throw a wrench into the work of 
divine love. The kind of reasonable nonbelief "left over" is most likely 
to be deficient in one way or another. This tension plays out in the ways 
Schellenberg variously falls back on either P2 or P3, with his efforts to 
shore up one or the other premise always making the other less plausible.
II
Schellenberg argues that whatever holds for reflective nonbelief, we may 
rest assured that inculpable, unreflective nonbelief abounds. There are 
"first of all, individuals—primarily from non-Western cultures—who 
have never so much as entertained the proposition 'God exists' (G), let 
alone considered the question of its truth or falsity." There also are those,
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"from both Western and non-Western backgrounds, who are to some ex­
tent familiar with the idea of God, but who have never considered with 
any degree of seriousness whether it is instantiated" (DH, p. 58).
Several issues problematize retreat to unreflective nonbelief. First, in 
DH Schellenberg limits his attention to reasonable doubt. Of unreflective 
nonbelief, he simply says, it "seems clear enough that [it] is inculpably 
exemplified" (59) and then moves on. Thus, his claim that my skepticism 
about P3 is "not only unsupported but false" rings a bit hollow (ORN, p. 
331). Second, though his latest essay gives grounds for the inculpability of 
unreflective nonbelief, he makes some questionable factual and normative 
assumptions. Many persons, he says, have never had "the theistic idea 
. . . squarely before their minds, and so have never been in a position to 
respond to it at all, whether culpably or inculpably" (ORN, p. 331). Also, 
some acquainted with the idea of God have "due to formative factors of 
upbringing and/or culture beyond their control, never been in a position 
to see the importance of thinking about it, and so have also never been in 
a position to respond to it in one way or the other" (ORN, p. 331). Both 
the factual and normative assumptions underlying Schellenberg's claims 
are arguable.
To turn first to the facts, consider Tertullian's anima naturaliter Chris- 
tiana—the soul that is by nature Christian.7 Tertullian is often overlooked 
but germane to the problem of the prejudicially dubbed "jungle savage" 
that is without God, for his interest lies with the "unreflective" masses, 
those who are "simple, rude, uncultured and untaught."8 Such souls' tes­
timonies are "simple as true, commonplace as simple, universal as com­
monplace, natural as universal, divine as natural," and alike in witnessing 
to the reality of God.9 "Is it a wonderful thing," he asks, "if, being the gift 
of God to man, [the soul] knows how to divine? Is it anything very strange, 
if it knows the God by whom it was bestowed?"10 "All the world over," 
he concludes, "is found the witness of the soul" to God.11 Even now, an­
thropologists and ethnographers regularly discern among non-Westerners 
something akin to Tertullian's anima naturaliter Christiana.
Andrew Lang and Wilhelm Schmidt offer the classic ethnographic 
treatments of the issue.12 Lang believes that we "may conceivably have 
something to learn . . . from the rough observations and hasty inferences 
of the most backward races."13 Challenging Edward Tylor's theory that the 
evolution of religion progressed through ancestor worship, spiritualism, 
henotheism, and ultimately monotheism, Lang documents how "the idea 
of God, as he is conceived of by our inquiring plain man, occurs rudely, 
but recognizably, in the lowest-known grades of savagery."14 He corrects 
errant assumptions about "savage" religion, for of "the existence of a be­
lief in a Supreme Being . . . there is as good evidence as we possess for 
any fact in the ethnographic region" and it "is certain that savages, when 
first approached by curious travelers, and missionaries, have again and 
again recognized our God in theirs."15 Schmidt follows Lang's lead but 
deepens the methodological rigor brought to bear on the ethnographic 
evidence. He marshals numerous scholarly judgments identifying belief 
in "a genuine Supreme Being" among primitive cultures, and he argues 
patiently against underestimating the sensitive religious dispositions and 
theological distinctions of which such peoples are capable.16 Explanations
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of "primitive monotheism" vary, and some dispute the existence of primi­
tive monotheism simpliciter, but ethnologists "nevertheless accept the 
existence of a belief and cult of a supreme being among many primitive 
peoples (as clearly proved by Schmidt in his UdG), no matter how this fact 
is to be interpreted."17
Schellenberg's appeal to most non-Westerners and many Westerners, 
allegedly incapable of getting God "squarely before their minds," is thus 
unduly presumptive. His factual assumption—that unreflective nonbelief 
is the rule and not the exception—is ethnographically questionable and 
arguably false. Clearly, it does not follow that there are not any unreflec­
tive nonbelievers. Yet the evidence does challenge the supposition that 
unreflective nonbelief is commonplace. Without denying the issue of any 
evil in a world with a perfect God, we must also avoid mistaking or exag­
gerating what evils there may be.
Schellenberg furthermore makes a doubtful normative assumption. 
Given that some fail to form the "theistic idea," or to discern the importance 
of considering the possibility of such a being, he assumes their nonbelief 
is inculpable. There are good reasons to resist his assumption. First, Chris­
tians have long held there is something wrong with not having formed 
the "theistic idea," or with being aware of the idea of God but neglecting 
it. Stephen Moroney outlines the ample account of the noetic effects of sin 
offered by scripture.18 Similarly, a tradition of Christian thinkers including 
Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Calvin, and Edwards seem to blame unbe­
lievers for their errant judgments.19 Edwards is especially clear, as William 
Wainwright notes:
That "sufficient light for the knowledge of God" is available is attest­
ed by scripture. It is also implied by God's purposes for humanity.
. . . So "if men have not respect to 'em as real and certain things," it 
can only be from "a dreadful stupidity of mind, occasioning a sottish 
insensibility of their truth and importance."20
In short, Christians ordinarily have regarded nonbelief (unreflective or 
not) as culpable.
Nontheists have reason to be cautious about regarding unreflective 
nonbelief as inculpable as well. Edwards stands with Socrates, Seneca, Pe­
trarch, and others who urge attention to the care and improvement of the 
soul alongside life's commonplace concerns. Socrates blames the Athenians 
for their unreflective dispositions and their neglect of matters of ultimate 
concern. Seneca faults those who "do not care how nobly they live, but 
only how long, although it is within the reach of every man to live nobly, 
but within no man's power to live long."21 Petrarch reproaches those who 
concern themselves with the superficial and suppress mindfulness of the 
significant, and specifically for "the way they shut out the thought of it 
even when it is forced upon them."22 Disparate in representing ancient 
Greek, imperial Roman, and medieval Christian outlooks, these three even 
so share Edwards's view that neglecting "eternal things" is blameworthy.23 
One need not be a theist to think human beings ought to consider such 
matters, can consider such matters, and thus may be faulted when they 
do not.
280 Faith and Philosophy
Schellenberg furthermore faces a problem with what Robert Adams 
calls "involuntary sins."24 While some voluntarily disregard "eternal 
things," others may involuntarily but still culpably discount God's real­
ity. Unfortunately, in his brief look at the issue, Schellenberg mistakes the 
scope and force of involuntary sin. He oddly thinks Adams's concern is 
limited to "morally repugnant beliefs," and since it is not morally repugnant 
to believe that the evidence for God is ambiguous, he says involuntary 
sin is "irrelevant and so may safely be disregarded" (DH, pp. 63-64). Yet 
Adams addresses a gamut of blameworthy states from barely noticeable 
peccadilloes to the morally reprehensible.25 If doubt about God's existence 
falls short of moral reprehensibility, that doesn't make it inculpable, but 
only something other than reprehensible. Not only does Schellenberg mis­
take the scope of involuntary sin, he also fails to take seriously the force of 
Adams's account. Wainwright points out that Schellenberg does not have 
"an argument for the claim that we aren't culpable for 'involuntary sins,' 
merely an appeal to intuition."26 Intuitive appeals simply will not do in the 
face of Adams's nuanced account of desire, emotion, deliberation, choice, 
and responsibility. Schellenberg's errors about the scope, force, and rel­
evance of involuntary sin give us another reason for caution in supposing 
unreflective nonbelief to be inculpable.
Finally, there is something disingenuous about his unqualified affirma­
tion of the existence of inculpable, unreflective nonbelief. Why set strin­
gent standards for reflective nonbelievers while ignoring such standards 
for unreflective nonbelievers? Schellenberg sets the bar high for reflective 
nonbelievers because he wants to be sure they are not deceptively or self­
deceptively dismissive of the evidence for God's existence. Yet if reflective 
persons may be deceptively or self-deceptively dismissive of the relevant 
evidence about God, is there any reason to suppose that unreflective per­
sons are any less disposed to deception or self-deception?
In sum, in the few words Schellenberg offers about unreflective nonbe­
lief, he assumes rather than argues that it is widely instantiated, and without 
making a case for it, he supposes that it is always inculpable. However, we 
have reasons for supposing that "unreflective nonbelievers" are not as gen­
erally thoughtless about or indifferent to God's existence as Schellenberg 
assumes, so that there are far fewer of them than he imagines. We also have 
cause to regard unreflective nonbelief as culpable. Not considering the sig­
nificant issues of human existence-including a highest good, God, to which 
unqualified commitment belongs-or briefly considering and then ignor­
ing such questions, is blameworthy. Human beings should consider such 
questions, and they are in a position, at least sometimes, to consider such 
questions unless they ignore the profound for the picayune. Not least of all, 
"involuntary sin" leaves open the possibility that unreflective nonbelievers 
are culpable for their nonbelief even if they do not arrive at it voluntarily.
III
Nonetheless, Schellenberg might maintain P3's truth. The odds seem to 
favor it. Given billions of people, some form of reasonable nonbelief is 
probably instantiated. If someone, however exceptional, through no fault 
of her own fails to enjoy the benefits of divine relationship, then perhaps
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it is so much the worse for the idea of God. P3 might thus seem not only 
prima facie credible, as Schellenberg argues in DH, but also secunda facie 
credible despite my arguments.
Exposing two problematic positions taken by Schellenberg reveals P3's 
weakness within his overall argument. One relates to his view that reason­
able nonbelief of any duration constitutes an evil. The other concerns his 
neglect of the epistemic implications of our social interdependence. Both 
derive from another feature of his argument: Schellenberg says we must 
understand divine love from above, not from below.
If we understand divine love from above, Schellenberg says we can see 
that "a loving God would not permit inculpable nonbelief of any kind or 
for any duration" (ORN, p. 334). He is motivated not merely by the in­
trinsic attractiveness of seeing things from the divine perspective. Rightly 
identifying the constitutive qualities of reasonable nonbelief depends 
on seeing the issues "from above," he believes, for his "understanding 
of 'reasonable' and of 'unreasonable' nonbelief is derived from reflection 
on the love of God, and not determined by independent consideration of 
what these notions can be taken to mean" (ORN, p. 331).
Yet however much we might try to identify with God-em bracing God's 
nature, reflecting in light of God's omniscient wisdom, and loving in the 
profundity of divine charity-w e cannot succeed in really seeing things 
from above. We must allow, then, that accounts of divine love are subject 
to the limits and frailties of our view from below. Honestly appraising the 
humble position we occupy reminds us that divine love could be different 
from what we imagine.27
Be that as it may, Schellenberg believes that, looking from above, God 
would prevent reasonable nonbelief of any kind or for any duration. This 
claim seems incredible in both its typological and temporal aspects. Tak­
ing the temporal portion first, consider the following:
(P2a) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur 
for as long as five years.
(P2b) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur 
for as long as five weeks.
(P2c) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur 
for as long as five minutes.
Schellenberg insists that God would not allow us any diminution of epis- 
temic access vis-a-vis God's reality for any period of time whatsoever. He 
holds that divine love carries with it the necessity of our capacity for unin­
terrupted discernment of God's reality, unless we culpably resist it. Taking 
the typological claim in turn, consider other specifications of P2:
(P2d) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur 
for St. John of the Cross.
(P2e) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur 
for any novice Christian.
(P2f) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur 
for any five-year-old child.
Combining the temporal and typological terms, yet other possibilities 
arise:
(P2 ) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur 
for St. John of the Cross for as long as five days amidst his dark 
night of the soul.
(P2h) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur 
for any five-year-old child for as long as five minutes.
If such cases count against God's existence, it would seem something has 
gone awry.
Looking at matters "from below" sheds light on the problem. To his 
credit, Schellenberg allows the divine-human relationship to be under­
stood developmentally. "Were it to obtain, it would admit of change, 
growth, progression, regression. It might be shallow or deep, depending 
on the response of the human term of the relation" (DH, p. 28). If develop­
ment marks our relationship with God, then starts, halts, jumps, and rever­
sals are only to be expected. The reasons why are not difficult to ascertain. 
The "response of the human term of the relation" includes not only our 
voluntary responses to God, but involuntary factors impinging on our re­
lationship with God. Think of the forms of human limitation—of cognitive 
power, attention, and stamina; of bodily appetites, exhaustion, disease, 
and death; of social location and interdependence. Amidst such realities, 
it is unsurprising that reasonable nonbelief of some duration arises within 
human experience. Perhaps one man's attention, due to neurochemical 
imbalances, fails him, and God's palpable presence one moment seems 
unrecoverable the next. Maybe one woman's psychologically crippling 
home life renders the trust propaedeutic to love of God beyond her, and 
the idea of God's reality seems fantastical. Or suppose a child reared in the 
church, given to experiencing divine benefaction during prayer and wor­
ship, suffers an injury that frustrates the ease of sensing God's company. 
Suppose in such cases that reasonable nonbelief obtains.28 No perfectly 
loving God would allow this for even five minutes, Schellenberg thinks. 
How then can the divine-human relationship "admit of change, growth, 
progression, [and] regression"? Would God allow movement between the 
shallow shoals and great deeps within a dynamic relationship, but never 
allow anyone so much as to wonder where and whether God is? What 
about the saintly such as St. John of the Cross, whose refined faith emerges 
out of the crucible of God's sometime apparent absence?
Schellenberg's failure is his neglect of what we are. Essential to human 
nature are the constraints of embodied, dependent rational creatures.29 Were 
we finite rational beings for which doubts about God were impossible, we 
would be angelic, pure intellects and not interdependent, psychosomatic 
amalgamations. Both our embodiment and social interdependence play 
roles. Given such things as chemical imbalances, psychological trauma, 
and physical injury, we can lose sight of important truths without cul­
pability. We also can suffer epistemic harm through the fault of others, 
including the development of belief sets that make it hard to acknowledge 
God.30 To say we should be safe from reasonable nonbelief attributable to 
the constraints of human nature is to say, in effect, that God should not
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have created us. We rather should say that God—in creating embodied, 
socially interdependent, rational creatures—leaves open the possibility of 
epistemic failure deriving from physical embodiment and social interde­
pendence. It will not do to complain that God should intervene, making 
his reality beyond doubt when embodied minds suffer frailty or when 
epistemic harm by third parties threatens. The unfailing intervention of 
a deus ex machina would play false with what we are, rendering chimeric 
bodily limit and social interdependence. Ultimately, something like Carte­
sian acceptance of our creaturely finitude, with gratitude for the insights 
about God of which we are capable (unless resisted through our own or 
another's culpability), seems the best response to the challenge of divine 
hiddenness—more so than taking limited epistemic access to God's reality 
as an insurmountable problem of evil.31
IV
I have expressed doubts about the kind of reasonable nonbelief needed 
for Schellenberg's argument to gain traction. The dubious assumptions 
he makes about unreflective nonbelief render it less useful than he imag­
ines. The problem of involuntary sin leaves open another line of objec­
tion. He tries to ease the burden of meeting P3 by widening the meaning 
of "reasonable" based on his view of divine love. Yet the idea that God 
would preclude reasonable nonbelief "of any kind or for any duration" 
has defeaters grounded in human nature. In short, though he sees reason­
able nonbelief as a widespread human experience, it is not as prevalent or 
typically inculpable as he claims, and where we might most readily find it, 
explanations saving the designs of a perfect God are available. One last is­
sue merits attention: the problem of self-deception, to which I have made 
passing reference above.32
Howard-Snyder and Moser see "a distinctively epistemic problem for 
the proponent of the argument from divine hiddenness." It is "no easy 
task to tell whether any particular candidate for inculpable nonbelief pos­
sesses or fails to possess those motivations, attitudes, and dispositions that 
putatively explain their inculpable nonbelief."33 This is because no matter 
how one gauges honesty, scrupulousness, self-critical judgment, etc., it is 
possible to subtly shade one's take on the evidence, or faintly trim one's 
diligence in seeking evidence, or imperceptibly privilege one's long-held 
judgments. Still, Schellenberg says "we can sometimes have good grounds 
for believing an individual to be honest . . . and also that some doubters 
are honest" (ORN, p. 332).
Difficulty strikes at multiple levels. First, on what grounds might one 
judge oneself not to be self-deceived about the evidence for God's exis­
tence? I offered a list in DRNE including "exemplary investigative proce­
dure, great expenditure of time and energy, honesty in other situations, 
love for truth, rational self-control, and . . . desire to have the issue re­
sponsibly settled." Perhaps those qualities make a case for the non-self- 
deceptiveness of someone's investigation. Other attributes might strengthen 
the case. Trenchant self-criticism is good, since pride is a deadly sin and 
can cause intellectual error. With Pascal, we might look for willingness to 
seek "what the Church offers by way of instruction."34 Perhaps additional
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desiderata could be identified. Still other issues remain. How many of the 
specified attributes must be instantiated to warrant a favorable judgment 
about the adequacy of investigation? To what extent is a favorable judg­
ment compromised by a failure to instantiate one or more of the speci­
fied attributes? By what means may one measure the degree to which one 
instantiates these desiderata?
Second, leaving aside these difficulties, cannot the specified qualities 
always be self-deceptively instantiated? That one could self-deceptively 
instantiate honesty, scrupulousness, and self-critical judgment means that 
judgments about self-deception are deeply problematic. Shawn Floyd 
asks, "If people's beliefs about themselves are shaped by unreliable dox- 
astic practices, then how could they know whether they are self-deceived? 
Their self-understanding may be shaped by beliefs that are themselves 
self-deceptively produced."35 One can seem to be, to want, or to do some­
thing without really being, wanting, or doing that thing. To try to appear 
one way against the reality of things constitutes deception. When one is 
not aware that an inconsistency exists between what-seems and what-is, 
then self-deception looms. The insurmountable difficulty is that one can 
seem—both to others and to oneself—to be honest about the evidence 
for the reality of God without really being honest. One can appear—both 
to others and to oneself—to want responsibly to resolve the question of 
God's existence without really wanting to do so. One can seem—both to 
others and to oneself—to engage in all of the activities conducive to ratio­
nal investigation of God's existence without really doing so. One can, that 
is, engage in deception and self-deception without appearing to do so. 
Indeed, it is necessary that they not appear as such in order to succeed. 
Successful deception and self-deception, by their very nature, are all but 
undetectable to the subjects of the deception.
Third, some self-deception may be "simple," when one blatantly ne­
glects one's epistemic responsibility, but most is "complex." Complex 
self-deception arises when one has mixed motives, or a divided will, and 
thereby can in one way claim fair judgment, but in another way can be 
faulted for less than a fair judgment. One can want and not want to pos­
sess the truth; one can desire and not desire to be honest. As Wainwright 
observes, "the fact that many agnostics and atheists want to believe in 
God is consistent with their also not wanting to do so. For both can be true 
of the same person. Indeed, theists themselves often display the same 
ambivalence."36 Among the epistemically responsible, self-deception is 
likely complex when it occurs. As difficult as simple self-deception can 
be to detect, complex self-deception is all the more intractable. This ex­
plains how Schellenberg's understanding of self-deception goes wrong. 
He writes,
initial awareness and deliberate forgetting [of one's neglect of the 
evidence] suffice to make the neglect which one later fails to notice 
voluntary, and culpable so long as it lasts. These things are also nec­
essary for voluntariness and culpability in such neglect. . . . This is 
important, because it shows that persons not given to dishonesty as 
blatant as has just been described make very poor candidates for 
doubt that is self-deceptively culpable. (ORN, p. 332)
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If all neglect were blatant, then perhaps more confidence in the capacity to 
avoid, detect, or repent of it would be warranted. Belying Schellenberg's 
austere depiction of human psychology, though, are the complexities of 
self-deception. Since self-deception is often more subtle than brazenly de­
fying duty and subsequently suppressing memory of bad faith, a more 
modest finding is warranted: "Human beings are enormously compli­
cated, and it is no easy task to tell . . . ."37
Schellenberg might respond that I am expressing gratuitously radi­
cal doubt about human trustworthiness. Yet a wealth of social scientific 
evidence suggests the ubiquity of self-deception. Floyd reports studies 
showing that virtually all people think they are more intelligent than 
average, more attractive than average, more deserving than others, etc.38 
However innocuous such judgments may be, they demonstrate how ordi­
nary self-deception is. To underestimate the possibility of self-deception, 
then, would be an error (maybe even a self-deceptive error!).
Regardless, Schellenberg might say, in some cases we can discern our 
susceptibility to self-deception and avoid it. After all, we sometimes see in 
some people evidence of this capacity. Yet self-consciously avoiding self­
deception sometimes does not guarantee the ability to do so all of the time. 
Moreover, we are likely to succumb to self-deception in the matters that 
concern us most, for therein do the complexities of motivation, will, and 
desire render the detection of self-deception most difficult.39 Bas van Frassen 
sees trouble all around, for
the weights to give to different bits of evidence are not "written into" 
that evidence but must be supplied by oneself; and the imagination 
. . . so active in directions pleasing to oneself, or alternatively fright­
ening, servant of wishes and fears, is itself the flawed mother of the 
flawed queen of the world! . . . how shall we ever find a spot of safety, 
secure from the distrust of one's own opinion?40
Schellenberg might also turn the tables. If those in doubt about God's ex­
istence may be self-deceived, then it is also true that those who hold out 
the possibility of self-deception among doubters may be self-deceived in 
their judgments. In one place, he says it is sinfully uncharitable to doubt 
nonbelievers' sincerity, for it constitutes "an ideologically based blindness 
to the good of (some) others and inability (in some contexts) to perceive 
sincerity and blamelessness. It looks a lot like a lack of openness to love."41 
Failures of charity are possible. Those who doubt the existence of God 
may be self-deceived about the blamelessness of their epistemic practices, 
but those who—through a failure of humility or charity-com e to doubt 
the inculpability of nonbelievers may also be self-deceived. But isn't this 
just to cast all of us into a skeptical abyss? It hardly amounts to a recipe 
for strengthening P3.
One need not be a Christian to question the prospect of unblemished 
self-knowledge. Nietzsche observes, "we are necessarily strangers to 
ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand 
ourselves, for us the law 'Each is furthest from himself' applies to all eter- 
nity—we are not 'men of knowledge' with respect to ourselves."42 Freud's 
skepticism about the human capacity for self-knowledge is equally well
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known. However, few traditions are more attuned to our flawed capacity 
for self-knowledge than Christianity. Augustine, for example, writes, "For 
though no one can know a man's thoughts, except the man's own spirit 
that is within him, there are some things in man which even his own spirit 
within him does not know."43 Augustine's concern is not one of mere limit. 
He asks God, "Does this remain the real truth—that I deceive myself and 
neither think nor speak the truth in your sight?"44
It is not out of self-assured superiority that Christians might doubt the 
honesty of others' search for God, but out of deep misgivings about any­
one's ability to avoid self-deception, including themselves. Thus is it that 
Christian ascetics embrace with utmost gravity the spiritual disciplines of 
self-mortification and practice the same with redoubtable intensity. They 
know how errant the will and the mind sometimes go, especially regard­
ing spiritually significant truths.45 Here again, van Frassen delineates the 
conundrum:
Beside the problems we have now about the very possibility of defin­
ing the conditions under which 'He deceives himself' is true, there 
are also strong doubts about whether (if there are such conditions) 
we could ever have adequate reason for thinking they obtain. . . . 
Once the possibility of self-deception is taken seriously it under­
mines all stories . . . , including those that attribute self-deception. 
We are in a quandary, personal as well as philosophical.46
Along with the other issues I have addressed, taking seriously this last in­
tractable quandary should bring us all—Schellenberg along with his favor­
able and critical reviewers—to question whether there exists the reasonable 
nonbelief needed for his argument's success. Where truly reasonable non­
belief is most probably instantiated, say in the examples explored in section 
III, it seems to pose no real difficulty for God's existence. Equally important, 
for the reasons discussed in section II reasonable nonbelief is simply not the 
pervasive evil Schellenberg thinks it to be. Finally, over all instances of ap­
parently reasonable nonbelief hovers the shadow of self-deception. Given 
the issues, it would be precipitous for Christians to forfeit belief in God 
because of Schellenberg's argument. Moreover, it would also be premature, 
pace Schellenberg, for those "who doubt or weakly believe . . . [to] come to 
believe that there is no God" (DH, p. 213).
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